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Abstract 
This paper argues that feeling compassion (and other relational emotions) makes an 
important, beneficial difference in adjudication, as it improves the exercise of the 
perspectival imagination, that is, it helps a judge to better understand, and to better 
describe, a situation as another person experienced it. Even where a judge has a highly 
developed capacity for empathy and sympathy (these being cognitive and evaluative 
processes that are distinguishable from emotions), there is something to be gained by 
a judge actually feeling compassion. However, given the potential for the distortion of 
understanding as a consequence of feeling compassion, any such feeling has to be 
accompanied by the robust exercise of the perspectival imagination, that is, by 
imagining multiple perspectives (including sometimes constructing imaginary ones), 
so as to avoid privileging any one perspective over others. It is further argued that this 
‘imagining by feeling’, as I call it in this paper, is not a threat to impartiality or the rule 
of law, but in fact a condition of it. It is part of the rule of law that people have a right 
to be heard, especially those whom we may otherwise find it difficult to understand. 
Imagining by feeling helps judges to better ‘hear’ a greater diversity of those who 





This paper argues for the importance of compassion in legal reasoning. The argument, 
in brief, is this: first, compassion (conceived of as a ‘cognitively-evaluative relational 
feeling’) improves the quality of what I will call ‘the perspectival imagination’; second, 
the perspectival imagination is necessary to the exercise of legal reasoning – and the 
more its quality is improved, the better the quality of legal reasoning, both in the 
instant case and over time; third, therefore, compassion assists in improving the 
quality of legal reasoning; but fourth, recognising the dangers involved in privileging 
any one perspective (precisely as a result of having, via feeling, imagined it more 
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richly), one must take care to exercise the ‘multi-perspectival imagination’ in legal 
reasoning – which means exercising compassion for a wide range of participants 
whose perspectives matter for the case at hand.  
 The three parts of the paper below broadly follow the above-mentioned steps 
of the argument. First, I articulate what I mean by cognitively-evaluative relational 
feelings, distinguishing them from the processes of empathy and sympathy. In this 
part, I also outline the process of compassion. Second, I define what I mean by the 
perspectival and multi-perspectival imagination, and look at the relations between 
emotion and imagination. And, third, I illustrate the potential for this compassion-
enabled multi-perspectival imagination in adjudication by reference to the DeShaney 
case (1989). 
 
II. Cognitively-evaluative relational feelings: situating compassion 
In this first part of the paper I situate my understanding of the process of compassion 
in three ways: first, I relate it to but also distinguish it from empathy and sympathy; 
second, I explain what I mean by classifying compassion as a cognitively-evaluative 
relational feeling; and third, I provide an outline of the process of compassion.  
 
2.1 Empathy, sympathy, compassion 
In order to better situate what I mean by compassion, I propose in this section to 
compare and contrast it to empathy and sympathy. I acknowledge the large literatures 
on all these terms – for present purposes, what is important is to offer stipulative 
definitions of them that will allow me to carve out what I take to be distinctive about 
compassion. 
By empathy, then, I propose to mean the ability and process of understanding 
what another person might be experiencing and the situation in which they are 
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experiencing it. Defined this way, empathy is cognitive – crucially, it need not involve 
experiencing any emotion, of actual feeling. Of course, the (initial and continual) 
development of empathy as an ability surely requires the experience of emotion, but 
it is not necessarily the case that any one exercise of empathy is (on this definition) an 
affective state or process. Further, empathy does not necessarily involve – as I argue, 
below, sympathy does – evaluation. It is, rather, the bare process of understanding – 
making inferences – as to what another person may be experiencing.  
 Sympathy is related to empathy, but in the sense I use it here, goes one step 
further, that is having attempted (as in empathy) some understanding of the situation 
of the other and their experience of it, sympathy involves an evaluation of that 
experience. Sympathy, then, is cognitively-evaluative (empathy being only cognitive). 
This sense of sympathy is arguably close to the way Adam Smith uses the concept in 
his Theory of Moral Sentiments (2002 [1759]), where the impartial spectator approves 
or disapproves of the emotions of the person being observed – asking, for instance, 
‘would I, as an impartial spectator, also feel or have felt resentment in this situation?’, 
with consequences for one’s moral judgement. Evaluation here clearly depends on 
cognition – one must first be capable of understanding the situation of the other 
person before one can evaluate how they experience it. Crucially, as with empathy, 
we can exercise sympathy without feeling any emotion (though, again, our ability to 
sympathise develops as a result of emotional experiences and reflections on them – 
as indeed Smith is at pains to show). Thus, both empathy and sympathy are cognitive 
processes, with sympathy also being evaluative, and neither necessarily involve 
feeling any emotion. 
 We come, finally, to compassion. I acknowledge that compassion is necessarily 
cognitive (like empathy) and evaluative (like sympathy). With respect to the evaluative 
dimension, however, one has to be careful: I will be suggesting that compassion is 
necessarily thinly evaluative, meaning that the other person is salient to us and that 
we have some concern for them. This thin evaluation is necessary, but thick evaluation 
is only contingent. By thick evaluation I mean approving or disapproving of their 
feelings, for example whether they are proportionate or deserving. But despite the 
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overlap with empathy and sympathy in these ways, compassion is also different from 
them both in that it necessarily involves feeling. In short, the crucial point is that there 
is something it feels like to experience compassion – whereas this is not necessarily so 
for empathy and sympathy.  
It is notoriously difficult to articulate what is meant by ‘feeling’. I also 
acknowledge the debate in the literature on emotions as to whether emotions require 
feelings. Later, when I speak of the process of compassion, I refer to feeling some of 
the suffering one takes another to be in, and then feeling sadness for that suffering. 
These states may be experienced in different ways, but it seems to me arguable that 
they include: (a) some bodily changes (which are likely to differ across people), for 
instance a certain heaviness in one’s stomach when feeling some of the suffering one 
takes another to be in; and (b) a more immediate focus or concentration upon the 
object of one’s emotion, which may include a greater readiness or willingness to 
perform some action with respect to that object. It is important for my argument that 
this action may refer to imagination – to (as I will articulate it later) the mental activity 
of constructing images of possibilities and alternatives – for I shall be arguing that by 
feeling, we imagine more richly. Compassion, then, includes experiencing these states, 
and in this respect, compassion is unlike empathy and sympathy. The latter are more 
distant from the object and one’s actions, less focused, less self-involving – and, again, 
crucially for my argument, less likely to stimulate the imagination.  
 
2.2 Cognitively-evaluative relational feelings 
Emotions, for present purposes, are then cognitively-evaluative feelings. By thinking 
of emotions in this way, I express solidarity with those theories that treat emotions as 
intelligent, as ‘concerned with receiving and processing information’ (Nussbaum, 
2001, p. 23), and to some extent as judgements or appraisals of value. Compassion is 
an emotion – and it is thus also a cognitively-evaluative feeling. However, it is a 
particular kind of emotion. To help see this, let me draw an analytical map of some of 
the different dimensions of emotions.  
Page 5 of 28 
 
For a start, emotions can have three objects. Our emotions can be: (1) world-
directed (as when we fear something in the environment, for example a tidal wave, a 
storm etc.); (2) self-directed (as when, for instance, we experience self-pity, or are 
scared of ourselves);1 and other-directed emotions (what I call ‘relational emotions’, 
of which compassion is one). The point of making such distinctions is that there may 
well be different cognitive and evaluative abilities that are exercised, or exercised in 
different ways, depending on the objects our emotions are directed to.  
Relational (that is, other-directed) emotions can be further broken down in 
various ways. First, one can distinguish between three different modes of interaction: 
first, one can experience relational emotions in a directly interactive (second-
personal) way, for example in face-to-face interaction; second, one can experience 
them communally, as when, for instance, one feels safety in numbers;2 and third, one 
can experience them spectatorially. Once again, there may be different abilities at 
stake in these different modes – for example, one must surely be quicker, make faster 
guesses, more fragile and tentative inferences, in a direct interactive encounter than 
one can (usually) afford in the spectatorial mode. The spectatorial mode itself, 
however, can also be further broken down: arguably, it makes a difference whether 
one is actually observing someone and their situation (for instance, witnessing an 
accident on the street) – the ‘observational’ sub-mode – or reading a report / 
description of it (as in a novel, or a witness statement) – the ‘testimonial’ sub-mode. 
For the purposes of this paper, I am interested in the spectatorial mode of relational 
emotions, and especially those in the testimonial sub-mode, namely those that are 
experienced in the course of reading a report or hearing a description of someone 
else’s experience. Thus, I acknowledge that compassion can be experienced in various 
modes of interaction, but I focus here on it as experienced in the spectatorial 
(testimonial) mode. 
Further, one can also break down relational emotions into non-mediated and 
mediated ones. Thus, one can speak of the emotions we experience vis-à-vis others in 
                                                 
1 Shame and guilt are more complex – they may be a mix of other-directed and self-directed 
emotions. 
2 I owe this point to Dermot Feenan. 
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a way that is not mediated by another emotion, for example one can feel envious of 
another. But one can also experience a relational emotion that is first mediated by 
another one – for instance, in compassion one arguably needs to experience some of 
the suffering3 one takes (knows or infers) the other to be in, before one feels sadness 
for them. One can think of other examples too: schadenfreude or emotions closely 
related to compassion (such as pity). For the purposes of this paper, I am interested 
in the mediated relational emotions.  
In sum, then, for the purposes of this paper, I focus on compassion as a mediated 
cognitively-evaluative relational feeling, experienced in the spectatorial (testimonial) 
mode.  
 
2.3 The process of compassion 
Situated in the way I have above, it is important now to outline the process of 
compassion. The first point to make is precisely that it is not a state or episode, but a 
process – a temporally-extended series of linked (mental and bodily) states. There is 
a tendency to sometimes speak of emotions as immediate, transitory and sudden – 
and of persons being swept up by them. This way of thinking about emotions tends to 
be connected to thinking of them as opposite to reason, as non-cognitive or non-
evaluative, or as non-intelligent. I acknowledge that it is important not to lose sight of 
some emotional experiences being (somewhat) like this – but on the whole, and in 
keeping with the above cognitively-evaluative positioning of emotions, I am proposing 
here we think of emotional experiences as complex, multi-layered, multi-stage 
processes, in which a mixture of abilities (cognitive, evaluative, and at various levels 
of development and dexterity) is exercised. It is also important to emphasise that 
reflection can be part of an emotion, and that it arguably necessarily is part of some 
particularly complex emotions (especially those, as above, that are mediated).  
                                                 
3 I acknowledge there is a large literature on the distinction between pain and suffering. For 
present purposes, I refer to suffering as this is arguably the more inclusive concept.  
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 Compassion, as a process then, can be thought of as – at the very least – 
containing the following five stages: 
 
1. A thinly cognitively-evaluative state of both awareness of another person (as 
being an other) one is interacting with, observing or imagining, accompanied 
by – and this is really inseparable from that awareness – an interest in or 
concern for that other person. Another person, then, must be both cognitively 
and evaluatively salient for one – they must be in the sphere of one’s 
phenomenal (whether sensory or imaginative) reach and interest. This salience 
of and interest in the other can either be voluntary or involuntary (for example, 
our attention and interest can be prompted by some loud or sudden noise, or 
we can make ourselves focus on some other without being prompted to do 
so).  
 
2. Stimulated by this initial awareness and concern / interest, one then needs to 
exercise further cognitive effort, imagining the other’s situation and 
perspective. In this second stage, however, one need not yet feel any emotion 
(aside from that initial interest in / concern for the person, as per stage 1). It is 
also part of this stage that one begins to take the other person to be suffering 
– as a result of imagining something of their situation and perspective, one 
cognises that they may be suffering. 
 
3. Having imagined something of the other’s situation and their perspective of it, 
and inferred that they may be suffering, in the third stage one then feels 
something of the suffering that one has imagined the other person to be in. It 
is important to emphasise that one cannot assume that one is feeling the same 
as what the other person is in – one is merely feeling something of what one 
imagines or takes the other to be suffering. One can be entirely mistaken about 
this – one may, for instance, have misread the expressions of another person, 
possibly as a result of cultural differences. It is, thus, an important part of the 
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process of compassion that one is aware of the possibility that one has mis-
interpreted what state the other person is in. In that sense, self-reflexive 
humility is an important part of the process of compassion. Nevertheless, I take 
it to be key to the process of compassion that one actually feels some of the 
suffering that one has taken or imagined the other to be in. 
 
4. Having felt something of the suffering one imagines or takes the other person 
to experience, one is then likely to return to imagining the situation of the 
other and their perspective on it. Indeed, there is likely to be a multiple back-
and-forth between feeling some of what one takes to be the suffering of the 
other and imagining (increasingly more richly) their situation and perspective. 
The two processes are naturally difficult to disentangle (I am disentangling 
them somewhat artificially for analytical purposes). As I will go on elaborate, 
feeling some of the suffering one takes the other to be in stimulates one to 
imagine the situation from their perspective more richly, and imagining it more 
richly, may well stimulate one to feel more of the suffering one imagines them 
to be in.  
 
5. Finally, having both imagined and felt some of the suffering of the other 
person, one then feels sadness for their suffering.4 This is also a crucial step, 
without which there is no compassion. One has to be capable of stepping 
outside the perspective of the other, and experience the feeling (that one has 
oneself, as oneself) for another’s suffering. The feeling of sadness for another’s 
suffering may also result in one returning to imagine the situation and 
                                                 
4 This feeling is more complex than I can describe here. One point to make is that feeling 
sadness for the suffering one imagines another to be in need not necessarily equate to 
condescension. Thus, a person observing runners training for a marathon, may experience 
compassion for them (including feeling sadness for their suffering as she imagines it), even 
though she believes that this suffering is something they have voluntarily chosen and that, in 
their own eyes, it is good for them (e.g. that getting through the training it will make them 
better runners). One can, then, experience compassion for others while at the same time 
recognising and respecting their independent agency. 
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perspective of another more richly, and to better understand the suffering 
they may be in, thereby also intensifying the feeling of sadness for another.   
 
These are the minimal bones of what is a multi-layered, multi-stage, and also back-
and-forth, dynamic process of the emotion of compassion.   
To this basic structure, one may add several extra elements. Space will not 
permit me to discuss these in detail, so let me simply flag two of them. For some, most 
notably Nussbaum (2001, pp. 311-315), there is necessarily a stronger evaluative 
element in compassion, namely the evaluation of the other’s suffering as undeserved. 
I suggest that it is possible for me to experience sadness for the suffering I take 
another to be in without having evaluated them as undeserving. Yet more strongly, 
though also more rarely, it is also possible to experience that sadness even after 
having evaluated someone as deserving of suffering. I acknowledge that this requires 
effort and may be a question of skill – one may need to train oneself to be able to 
experience sadness for the suffering of those who one either does not evaluate as 
undeserving of it, or that one does evaluate the other as deserving of that suffering. 
Indeed, this may be a crucial skill (let us call it the skill of overcoming strongly 
evaluative compassionate resistance) in many circumstances in which one is given the 
task of evaluating the conduct of a wide variety of persons (as judges in legal 
institutions are). For these reasons, I would consider this stronger evaluative element 
a contingent one. I would also regard as contingent Nussbaum’s other condition, 
namely that the suffering for the other be serious rather than trivial (see Nussbaum, 
2001, pp. 306-311). Treating the other’s suffering as serious may be part of some 
experiences of compassion, but I also think it is possible to experience compassion for 
what may initially strike one as trivial, but which one comes to revise (precisely as a 
result of the process of compassion) as serious for that particular person.  
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III. Compassion and the (multi-) perspectival imagination 
 
In the above outline of the process of compassion, imagination played a key role. In 
this part of the paper, I want to zero in on this relationship between compassion and 
the imagination. I do so in two steps: first, discussing the sense in which the 
imagination can be perspectival and multi-perspectival; and second, turning to the 
relationship between emotion and imagination. I do so with a view to indicating, later, 
the importance of imagining (richly, as a result of feeling compassion for) the 
perspectives of (multiple) others in the process of legal reasoning. 
 
3.1 The perspectival and multi-perspectival imagination 
The perspectival and multi-perspectival imagination is a sub-set of imagination in 
general. The philosophical debate over the bounds of the imagination has intensified 
in the past few decades, and it has become common to speak of the variety of 
exercises of the imagination, all needing to be carefully distinguished.5 While 
acknowledging that there is little in these debates that is not controversial, I offer the 
following stipulative definition of the imagination for present purposes: it is the 
process of deliberately6 and effortfully constructing mental images7 of what it might 
be like for someone else to experience a certain situation.   
                                                 
5 See, for instance, Stevenson (2003) and Kind (2013).  
6 I acknowledge, naturally, that imagination can be spontaneous or even unconscious (as in 
dreams – see Spaulding, 2016), and I also acknowledge that even in cases of deliberate 
imaginings (as also for instance in the use of thought experiments in science and philosophy) 
there will be plenty that we imagine non-deliberately. We are, in short, never in complete 
control of our imaginings – but, equally, our imaginings are often constrained by our 
knowledge of reality (so they are not entirely flights of fancy). For more on how imagination 
is constrained, see Kind and Kung (2016).   
7 Again, there is a robust and long-standing debate as to whether images are necessary for 
imagination (for a defence, see Kind, 2001). I think that it is possible to imagine without mental 
Page 11 of 28 
 
 This definition already – in its final feature – references the idea of perspective. 
Indeed, for a number of philosophers, perspective is the key feature that differentiates 
thinner, typically propositional imagining (for example, imagining that, or also 
supposing or conceiving) from thicker, non-propositional imagining. Thus, for 
instance, Richard Moran in a classic paper, distinguishes between the ‘hypothetical 
and dramatic imagination’ (1994, p. 104), arguing that the latter involves adopting a 
perspective, and as a result requires a different kind of effort, and with different things 
at stake for the imaginer.8 More recently, Magdalena Balcerak (2016) has also argued 
for a distinction between supposing, conceiving and imagining, on the basis that it is 
only in imagining that we adopt ‘experiential perspective-taking’ (2016, p. 49). Like 
Moran, Balcerak stresses the self-involvement of this perspective-taking, saying that 
it involves putting ‘myself in the position of somebody who actually perceptually 
experiences [for example] an apple’ (2016, p. 49).  
 I think there is an important ambiguity in this way of thinking about 
perspective – namely, as something self-involving. I suggest it is crucial to keep in mind 
two kinds of imagining the perspectives of others: first, one can project oneself into 
the situation and experience of another, asking ‘what would I feel if I was in that 
situation?’, or, second, one can instead consider all that one knows about that person 
and their situation and ask, ‘what might that other person be experiencing in that 
situation?’ The second is a more robust way of exercising the perspectival imagination; 
it arguably requires greater sustained, imaginative effort to try to understand how 
another person might be experiencing a certain situation.9  
                                                 
imagery, but this is often a matter of definition (e.g. if one includes supposing or conceiving 
in one’s definition, then one will think it is possible to imagine without imagery).  
8 Moran says that in the case of dramatic imagination, ‘more is revealed and given of oneself 
than in the case of ordinary counterfactual reasoning’ (1994, p. 105).  
9 See Coplan (2011), who is also drawing on the work of Peter Goldie: ‘In other-oriented 
perspective taking, a person represents the other’s situation from the other person’s point of 
view and attempts to stimulate the target individual’s experience as though she were the 
target individual. Thus, I imagine that I am you in your situation…I attempt to simulate your 
experiences from my point of view… Empirical studies have shown that other-oriented 
perspective taking requires greater mental flexibility and emotional regulation…than self-
oriented perspective-taking… (pp. 54-55). 
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 For these reasons, I prefer not to focus on this distinguishing feature of 
perspective.10 Instead, I want to draw on a different kind of distinction – argued for by 
Joshua Landy in his work on Proust (2004) – namely, the distinction between 
perspective and viewpoint (or point of view). In brief, a viewpoint is something that 
we might share in common with others – it is literally the angle from which we might 
look upon a situation. Thus, we can think of standing and facing in a certain direction, 
and from that viewpoint seeing a series of church steeples. A viewpoint, then, is not 
something that uniquely belongs to that other person. A perspective, however, goes 
considerably further than something we can all see from a certain viewpoint. 
According to Landy:  
 
…if we wish to learn something about the inner ‘world’ of another individual – 
that aspect of her perspective which is not held in common with the rest of 
humanity – we can do so only by studying the combinations that she typically 
(and unconsciously) produces among the elements of any given domain. (2004, 
p. 60) 
 
In the case of Marcel’s perspective – Marcel being the character that Proust explores 
in his great novel – we must therefore pay attention to the associations and 
connections that inform his own construction of the situation. Perspective is an active, 
affectively-rich, meaning-constructing process. It takes time and effort to learn 
anything – even a small fraction – of someone else’s perspective (for Proust, a master, 
it takes many years and over four thousand pages). We learn something about 
Marcel’s experience of the steeples from the following quotes (in a piece of writing by 
Marcel that we are made privy to by Proust): 
 
                                                 
10 I leave for another occasion the very interesting idea that in the other-oriented kind of 
imagining others, the self may still be necessarily involved in some way. 
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The minutes passed, we were travelling fast, and yet the three steeples were 
still a long way ahead of us, like three birds perched upon the plain, motionless 
and conspicuous in the sunlight… …a little later, when we were already close 
to Combray, the sun having set meanwhile, I caught sight of them for the last 
time, far away, and seeming no more now than three flowers painted upon the 
sky above the low line of the fields. They made me think, too, of three maidens 
in a legend, abandoned in a solitary place over which night had begun to fall. 
(Proust, quoted in Landy 2004, p. 52) 
 
Birds, flowers and maidens – the steeples are constructed to have a meaning by 
Marcel; those associations and connections refract his interests, needs and values (see 
Landy 2004, p. 60). Proust here is giving us access to Marcel’s perspective – and not 
just the viewpoint from which he sees the steeples.  
  For Landy, there is similarity between the way Proust articulates and explores 
Marcel’s perspective and the perspectivism of Friedrich Nietzsche11 – and drawing this 
out will allow me to introduce the idea of the multi-perspectival imagination. 
According to R. Lanier Anderson, who Landy draws on, ‘a perspective [is] a way of 
organising our experience’, and this is not because of some Kantian transcendental 
concepts that make experience possible, but because of our ‘contingent’ and ‘variable’ 
set of ‘needs, interests and values’ (1998, p. 3). What Proust adds here, arguably, is 
that he shows very concretely just how such needs, interests and values manifest 
themselves in how persons (especially Marcel) experiences the world and others. 
More explicitly, Proust shows us that we cannot rest content with the abstract thesis 
that experience is perspectival in the sense Nietzsche means that (as above). Rather, 
in order to imagine another’s perspective, we must try to visualise – in imagination – 
those needs, interests and values in the concrete experiences of persons in their 
relations with the world and others.   
                                                 
11 Indeed, for Landy, ‘the Proustian view [is] a sophisticated (and unwitting) refinement of 
Nietzschean perspectivism’ (2004, p. 57). 
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 But Nietzsche also adds something – which perhaps Proust does not do enough 
of in the novel (given the focus on Marcel). At stake is the usual problem with any 
more general (philosophical) celebration of perspectivalism – namely, relativism and 
epistemological / normative anarchy. Nietzsche deals with that challenge – ‘what now 
for objectivity? Are there any standards?’ – by saying that the idea of objectivity as a 
form of ‘contemplation without interest’ (neutrality, the view from nowhere, or non-
perspectivism) is ‘a nonsensical absurdity’, adding more positively:  
 
The idea is that different perspectives reveal different aspects of things, and 
that the pursuit of objectivity is just the attempt to broaden one’s perspectives 
by using others to take account of aspects of the world obscured by one’s 
own… the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, 
different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our 
‘concept’ of the thing, our ‘objectivity’, be. (Nietzsche, quoted in Anderson 
1998, p. 18)  
 
Perspectivism, then, does not collapse into relativism, but neither does it mean we 
must adopt non-perspectival objectivism. Instead, we are enjoined to improve our 
knowledge – for example of some situation, or some issue – by seeing how differently 
it is constructed by multiple perspectives (how different needs, interests and values 
are refracted concretely in particular experiences of that situation). Indeed, our 
knowledge is further improved by not only constructing what that situation might be 
like from multiple other perspectives, but in switching back-and-forth between 
them.12 The multi-perspectival imagination, then, is valuable because by deploying 
multiple perspectives we can construct a more complete (but never entirely complete) 
picture of the constellation of needs, interests and values at stake; and this value is 
                                                 
12 See Anderson (1998, p. 19), for an example of medical decision-making that benefits from 
perspective-switching. 
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enabled by the task of perspective-switching, including the experience of friction 
(axiological, affective) between different perspectives.13  
 Thus, to summarise on the topic of imagination: by the imagination in general 
I mean the process of deliberately and effortfully constructing mental images of what 
it might be like for someone to experience a certain situation; by the perspectival 
imagination, I mean more than seeing a situation from a certain angle (viewpoint) – I 
mean the active construction (in mental imagery) of the needs, interests and values 
of another person as they are refracted in the concrete and particular experiences of 
persons in their relations with the world and others (for instance, via the associations 
and connections they make between things in their experience); and by the multi-
perspectival imagination, I mean the process of constructing a variety of such 
perspectives, and switching between them, thereby accumulating greater knowledge 
of a situation. Imagining the perspectives of others requires a) resisting my own 
background knowledge and attempting to characterise the other as richly as one can; 
b) recognising that this process is a difficult one, which requires training and 
development; and c) exercising humility, in particular by recognising the necessary 
incompleteness of any one attempt to imagine the perspective of another. 
 
3.2 Emotion and imagination 
Having articulated what I mean by relational emotions and the perspectival and multi-
perspectival imagination, it is now time to turn to the relationship between them – a 
relationship that, as I will indicate in the final part of the paper, is important for the 
quality of legal reasoning. In doing so, I will be drawing mainly on Adam Morton’s 
Emotion and Imagination (2013). Morton makes some bold (though also interesting) 
claims as to that relationship – for instance, asserting that ‘all emotion involves 
imagination’ (2013, p. 3); that imagination ‘can be seen as a special case of emotion’ 
                                                 
13 This process of perspective-switching deserves more attention than I can afford it here. It is 
a topic (including the above-mentioned experience of friction) that has been explored, for 
instance, in literary theory (see e.g. Hartner (2012) for an overview, citing in particular the 
work of Uwe Lindemann on friction).  
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(2013, p. 21); and that ‘[p]erhaps emotion made thought [including imagination] 
possible’ (2013, p. 21). I am not here concerned with whether one is the sub-set of the 
other, or whether one makes the other possible. Indeed, for present purposes I can 
concede that we can experience emotion without the imagination, and that we can 
imagine without experiencing emotion. What is most helpful and important, however, 
is Morton’s idea that ‘emotion has an object and involves imagining scenarios around 
it’ (2013, p. 30), and more elaborately, that ‘[h]aving an emotion typically involves a 
complex of imagined possibilities, imagined reactions to them, and imagined 
sensations, and these imaginations are much of what the fear [or some other emotion] 
feels like’ (2013, p. 33). I have already spoken of emotions as complex, multi-layered 
processes. With Morton’s help, I now suggest that: (a) part of what makes emotions 
complex is that they often (though not necessarily) involve some imagination – 
indeed, sometimes a great deal of imagination; and (b) that part of what makes at 
least the perspectival imagination distinctive (from other kinds of imagination) is that 
it is typically accompanied by emotion – and, again, sometimes by a great deal of 
emotion – such that typically there is something it feels like to imagine how someone 
else might be experiencing a certain situation.   
 Further, and this is also critical for present purposes, Morton notices that in 
many cases emotion (and here I would include compassion) increases the richness and 
vivacity of imagining, which might further increase the intensity of the experience of 
an emotion. The relationship, then, is not only one of overlap at the same time, but 
also mutual stimulation over time. Here is one example he gives: 
 
…think of someone watching a skier approach an icy downhill run. She thinks 
of the run as very dangerous today, and wonders if the ski patrol are on duty. 
She is not worried about that skier so much as generally apprehensive about 
current conditions. Then she recognises the skier as her child, and suddenly 
she visualises all the bends on the run where one might fall, the trees one 
might run into, the moguls in surprising places, and has an impulse to rush 
down the run herself to give first aid, or take another route and alert the 
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patrol… She even has a stray thought of wolves in the woods preying on fallen 
skiers, and then a fantasy of her own car breaking down in a snowstorm so that 
she freezes before she is found. (2013, p. 32) 
 
The observer here first begins to imagine more richly on the back of an increase in 
feeling (of greater concern, having recognised the skier as her own child). Imagining 
more richly, in turn, intensifies her emotion (of concern for, fear of, her child), and this 
intensification of emotion further spurs her imagination, not only more richly, but 
even quite extravagantly (for example, imagining wolves). We can also surely relate to 
this example in various ways: we can think of other circumstances in which we have 
felt fear, where part of what it is like to feel fear is to imagine, indeed for the 
imagination to almost take over (for example, childhood fears of darkness, and 
imagining what was under the bed). But we can extend the example considerably 
beyond fear – consider jealousy, for instance, or resentment. Part of what it is to feel 
jealous (and what it feels like to experience jealousy) is to imagine what a beloved is 
up to with someone else – and, to imagine such scenes is to intensify the feeling of 
jealousy.  
 The same dynamics as to the mutually reinforcing relationship between 
emotion and imagination are at play in the case of compassion. Part, then, of the 
process of compassion is to imagine (concretely, with mental images) someone’s 
suffering in situation – understood from their perspective. The initial salience of and 
interest in another stimulates an initial act of imagining the situation from their 
perspective. This initial act of imagination, in turn, stimulates feeling (in compassion, 
feeling some of the suffering one imagines the other to be experiencing). This feeling, 
then, stimulates the perspectival imagination further. The more one feels, the more 
one imagines – and vice versa. In other words, the more one feels, the more richly one 
constructs the concrete associations and connections one takes to be constituting the 
other’s perspective. What is critical here is to see the relation (in time and over time) 
between the perspectival imagination (again, in its concreteness – and in concreteness 
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from a perspective, that is as filtered by that person’s needs, interests and values) and 
the feelings one experiences as part of the process of compassion.  
 Morton’s example, of course, also illustrates various dangers – the 
imagination, stimulated by emotion, can construct wildly implausible possibilities; 
and, the fact that we imagine more richly may be caused by bias, that is by who or 
what we are already predisposed to care about. These dangers are real, but I do not 
think they warrant the conclusion that we should thus dismiss the value of feeling 
imaginatively or imagining by feeling – that would be to give up on the considerable 
insights that engaging in such imaginative acts can provide (precisely into the 
perspectives of others). Thus, to the contrary, I would argue (along with Nietzsche) 
that we should instead (at least in contexts of judgement) exercise the multi-
perspectival imagination. Aiming to understand better a certain situation, we do not 
withdraw into allegedly non-perspectival abstractions, but instead enter into multiple 
concrete perspectives – and, in order to increase the quality of our imagining those 
perspectives, we do so with feeling. It is, to repeat, only by feeling that we can get 
closer to (by imagining, of course always imperfectly) the concrete and particular 
experiences of someone else’s perspective. 
 There is one final and important aspect to this affective dimension of 
imagination that I wish to mention, before going on in the next part to briefly illustrate 
the argument in the adjudicative context. That is the role of emotion in what is 
referred to as ‘imaginative resistance’. As Balcerak explains it, ‘imaginative resistance 
occurs when a subject is asked to imagine a particular situation, but is either unable 
or unwilling to do so’ (2016, p. 47). She goes on to claim that ‘most convincing 
examples’ of it ‘involve requests to imagine situations where morally highly deviant 
behaviour and attitudes are endorsed’, for example confronted with the case of Alice, 
who ‘took her new-born baby, put it into a cotton bag, closed the bag tightly with a 
rope, and threw it into the lake’, there may be resistance to imagining the scene, let 
alone Alice’s perspective (2016, p. 47). What Balcerak does not address here is the 
role of emotion – and yet, that role must be considerable. Faced with such an example 
there may be not only resistance to imagining – but also anger (moral anger, or even 
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outrage) against Alice, as well as stomach-churning sickness to imagining the scene 
(which leads to further resistance). Thus, just as imagining more richly is tied to 
emotion (in the ways I have discussed above), so is refusing to imagine or resisting 
imagining. Such resistances may be tolerable if reading a novel or watching a play or 
film – but they are different if the reader is tasked with evaluating Alice. What one 
needs to develop, then, is an ability to deliberately feel – in this case, some of Alice’s 
suffering, and then sadness for her – in order to not only better imagine her 
perspective, but also to challenge (and move somewhat beyond) resistance to 
imagining it. This is necessary if Alice is to be given the respect she deserves, not as 
someone who has murdered their baby, but as a subject of others’ judgement.  
 
IV. The adjudicative context 
In this third, and final, part of the paper, I wish to point – and I can only point, in a 
sketchy way – to how we might see the above account of compassion – as a 
cognitively-evaluative relational emotion linked closely to the perspectival 
imagination – in the context of exercising legal judgement. I do so by reference to the 
now (in)famous case in the law and compassion literature, namely the DeShaney case 
(1989).  
My argument, in general, is that actually feeling compassion will improve the 
quality of legal judgement. This is because the quality of a legal judgement depends in 
part on how well the multi-perspectival imagination is exercised by the judges, and 
that exercise, in turn, depends on actually feeling compassion – especially in cases 
(which are likely to be common) where judges might otherwise resist imagining. I have 
already argued for a conception of compassion as a complex, multi-layered, multi-
stage process, which involves (again, as I have developed it above) the perspectival 
imagination. Compassion – to reiterate the point once more – stimulates the 
perspectival imagination.14 What now needs to be developed is the connection 
                                                 
14 This is the crucial difference between the argument being presented here and the defence 
of empathy in Corso (2014), or of ‘the compassionate stance’ or ‘empathic point of view’ in 
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between the use of the multi-perspectival imagination and the quality of a legal 
judgement.  
There are three principal reasons why the multi-perspectival imagination is so 
important for the quality of a judgement:15 first, it assists judges in better applying 
legal concepts – which I would extend to those beyond constitutional / human rights, 
to all kinds of legal concepts (for example, economic duress, or offer and acceptance); 
second, by describing the perspectives of various stakeholders in the dispute, judges 
in the present case provide better resources for future courts; and third, it shows 
greater respect to parties coming before one and seeking a hearing. For reasons of 
space, I discuss only the first two in the next section. The first two are best discussed 
in the context of a particular case, and the third will be returned to in the final section 
below.16 
The skeleton facts17 of the US constitutional case of DeShaney are well known: 
a child, Joshua, was subjected to multiple beatings by his father. After receiving 
complaints, a county department of social services took various steps to protect 
Joshua (including briefly taking Joshua into care, and away from the father, only to 
hand him back, though under the regime of regular visits by a social worker). 
Eventually, the father beat the boy so badly that he suffered permanent brain damage. 
A suit was filed, by the representatives of the child, against the county on the basis 
                                                 
Zipursky’s classic paper (1990). In both cases, there is an emphasis on the cognitive, but not 
on the affective dimension of emotion.  
15 There may be other ways in which one could articulate / taxonomise the importance of the 
multi-perspectival imagination for legal reasoning, e.g. one could point to its significance for 
1) the quality of deliberation (recalling the difficulty of imagining, and also the benefits of 
perspective-switching, one could argue that this slows down our deliberation, helping us to 
distance ourselves from impulsive reactions to facts, and thus our biases, generating time and 
space for more careful reflection); 2) the quality of the justification (thus the quality of the 
reasons, and their ability to balance more of the relevant interests, needs and values at stake); 
and 3) the quality of description (i.e. of the facts, and especially the role of certain persons).   
16 The argument, in brief, would be that if one understands the rule of law – as Neil 
MacCormick did (2005) – as, in part, enabling a public space in which one can be heard, and if 
feeling compassion helps improve one’s ability to imagine the perspectives of others, then 
compassion is not a threat, but rather a condition of impartiality and the rule of law.  
17 In referring to them as ‘skeleton’ I by no means wish to suggest that the particular 
description that follows is in any way basic or neutral – like any description of any facts, it is 
necessarily narratologically and affectively charged.  
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that they had deprived the child of his liberty interest in bodily integrity, in violation 
of his rights under the substantive component of the fourteenth amendment’s due 
process clause. The majority found in favour of the county, interpreting the due 
process clause as not imposing an affirmative duty on the county to protect the child 
from private violence and thus not requiring the county to guarantee some minimum 
level of protection. There were two famous dissents – Justice Brennan’s and Justice 
Blackmun’s (it being the latter’s cry of ‘Poor Joshua!’ that catapulted this case into an 
anchor for the literature on law and compassion).  
 Others who have discussed this case (especially Zipursky, 1990) have shown 
how the quality of the judgement could have been improved (if informed by 
compassion) in various ways, for example; in the characterisation of the facts, in the 
interpretation of relevant past precedents, and in interpreting various related 
concepts. Improving the application of concepts is one of the reasons I gave above for 
the importance of imagining perspectivally. Let me say more about that now. Zipursky 
is certainly right to point out that a great deal more could have been articulated from 
the perspective of the child in this case – especially as it pertains to ‘deprivation of 
liberty’.18 Thus, the judges might have better understood how Joshua could be said to 
have been abandoned by the county department and its social services – this they 
could have done by imagining more richly what it might have been like for Joshua to 
be returned to his father’s house, with only regular visits from the social worker to 
protect him. Even if the judges did not in the end adopt the abandonment dimension 
of deprivation of liberty, articulating it would have offered a more nuanced, more 
complete application of the concept (as well as some of the relevant precedents) – for 
a start, having considered it, the judges would have had to provide reasons why the 
concept ought not to be stretched to include abandonment.  
 What I would add to Zipursky’s valuable analysis here is this: it is important for 
judges to experience compassion for Joshua here, and to do so not symbolically – in a 
moment, merely expressing sadness for Joshua’s fate – but as part of the complex, 
                                                 
18 Zipursky provides other illustrative examples of the importance of what – in my terms – 
involve the exercise of the perspectival imagination. See his discussion of the application of 
the concept of ‘unfairness’ (1990, p. 1135) and ‘inferior treatment’ (1990, p. 1137).  
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multi-layered, multi-stage process I referred to above, which includes imagining 
concretely what it might have been like for Joshua to have been returned to the 
father’s home and to have been left there. We might think, on first blush, that this is 
unnecessary when it appears to be so easy to experience compassion for Joshua in 
this case. Actually, however, compassion is never easy – it is difficult and effortful, for 
it requires concrete imagining of another’s suffering. Indeed, sometimes if 
compassion for one of the parties appears obvious, judges may feel like it is their duty 
not to say too much about it – precisely for fear of being cast as too biased and not 
impartial enough (arguably, one sees evidence of this attitude in the majority 
judgement of the DeShaney case). Thus, in this case, a great deal more could have and 
arguably should have been described of what it might have been like for Joshua to 
have experienced this situation – including the possibility that he, in some ways, 
enjoyed his father’s company and the comfort of his home, but that he might have 
also have felt entirely defenceless, without anywhere or anyone to turn to for help 
and support. What were Joshua’s options, when he was faced with his father’s 
aggression? Could Joshua appeal to the social worker when she visited – again, from 
his perspective, was this likely (especially if the father was present, or even if not, 
would he have felt comfortable saying something to the social worker in his own 
home)? All this could help better probe the normative bounds of the concept of 
‘deprivation of liberty’.  
 Of course, it would be inadequate and misleading to argue merely that the 
quality of the judgement could have been improved if the judges had taken greater 
care to imagine better Joshua’s perspective. That would be to argue for something like 
particularised-compassion-as-trumps – which carries with it all the dangers (especially 
bias, and the blindness of favouring one perspective because one feels compassion for 
it) that critics of the emotions have articulated many times. The key here is to add the 
multi-perspectival. Indeed, the DeShaney case is a good example of how the quality of 
the judgement would have been improved if the judges better imagined a wider 
variety of perspectives. These include not only Joshua’s, but also: 
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1. The perspective of the parents, for instance the father: given the high 
likelihood of imaginative resistance to the father’s perspective, it becomes all 
the more important to voluntarily and deliberately – with difficulty and effort 
– go through the process of compassion, including imagining what the 
situation might have been like for the father. This includes having the son 
initially taken away from him, the visits by the social worker, and then losing 
the son as a result of having beaten him. This may be relevant, for instance, to 
understanding what is at stake for parents – what needs, values and interests 
become important – when their relationship with their children is affected by 
the oversight of a child protection agency. It may also be important as a check 
against drawing on Joshua’s perspective too heavily. My suggestion here is that 
it is not enough to assume that one knows (in the abstract) what needs, 
interests and values are at stake – instead, one comes to acquire (build up) 
knowledge of those needs, interests and values by imagining richly particular 
perspectives. With some perspectives – as with the father here – there is likely 
to be very strong resistance to imagining, and it is here that deliberately 
undergoing the process of compassion can help to overcome that resistance.   
 
2. The case-worker’s perspective: a lot was said in the case that put the social 
worker here in a very bad light – for example Justice Brennan says that the 
detail of abuse ‘chronicled by the social worker…seems almost eerie in light of 
her failure to act upon it’ (DeShaney, p. 209) – and, once again, a certain 
amount of imaginative resistance is likely to be experienced with respect to 
the social worker’s perspective. It is, however, important to understand, for 
instance, that the social worker has to act in an incredibly difficult dual role in 
such cases: she is both an advocate for the family as well as an enforcer of the 
child-protection policy. She has to use her judgement to balance these two 
roles in particular cases. Attempting to balance these contradictions and 
pressures can cause suffering for a social worker, as when, for instance, she 
agonises over whether she has made the correct decision not to intervene 
further. It is dangerous (and lessens the quality of the judgement) to be too 
quick and judge her actions, without attempting to better imagine her 
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perspective. Further, it is a sign of respect for her, and for social workers in 
general, that one attempts to imagine richly what the situation may have been 
like for her.  
 
3. The perspective of the local department of social services: this may seem like 
the most surprising suggestion of all – can we feel compassion for, and imagine 
the perspective of, an institution? It seems to me possible to imagine the 
needs, interests or values of an institution – and how, for instance, they may 
be affected by the decision one makes in the case (here, especially if one finds 
in favour of Joshua). Justice O’Connor did indeed refer, in the oral argument,19 
to a concern that if the argument of the petitioners was upheld, the effect on 
state departments might be that they would not be able to undertake child 
protection services at all. One can, surely, imagine – more or less richly – not 
only the immediate impact on the institution (those who work there and may 
lose their jobs), but also those to be affected by the institution not being able 
to offer such services (other children and families). In that sense, then, one can 
imagine the perspective of the institution, and if one can do that, then arguably 
one could also feel compassion for all those persons affected by what the 
institution does (or may not do in the future). The point here is that it improves 
the quality of legal reasoning to consider, in some richness, the needs, values 
and interests at stake from the perspective of the institution.  
 
Taking into account these perspectives – imagining them, in their concreteness and 
particularity – is not just a matter of improving the quality of the application of 
relevant concepts in the instant case. It is also a matter of providing better resources 
for future courts. The description of facts – often multiple descriptions in multi-
member benches – is one of the key features of the resourcefulness of the common 
law. It is certainly something that complexifies the task of judges and in general makes 
the system less efficient in the long-term. However, it produces vital normative 
                                                 
19 See minute 8.47 in the oral argument, available here: 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-154 (last accessed 26 June 2016). 
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resources, for it gives future courts access to a highly contextualised set of normative 
judgements, in which there is room for exploring differences and similarities between 
fact patterns. There is no doubt that recommending to judges that they exercise the 
multi-perspectival imagination, in a way that is accompanied (because it is so 
effectively stimulated) by compassion, would complexify the task still further. There 
will be a limit, clearly, to how much of such imagining – and the correlate describing – 
judges will be able to engage in. But it is vitally important that they do – not only 
because it gives them insight into the needs, interests and values at stake in the 
decisions they are making, but also because it allows them to communicate this to 
future courts.  
The resourcefulness of the common law is its anchor to particular facts – and 
not abstract statements of principle – for it is that which allows future courts to take 
more measured, careful, nuanced decisions. The richer description of particular facts 
that results from the exercise of the multi-perspectival imagination enables that 
further – and this is especially important in cases where there are needs, interests and 
values that can easily be missed or neglected as a result of a tendency to resist 
imagining certain perspectives.  
 
V. Conclusion 
Compassion stands out as one of the most important emotions for the adjudicative 
context. It does so as one of the paradigmatic relational (that is, other-directed) 
emotions. It also does so because it is often associated with mindless bias – something 
that, if experienced, is sometimes thought to be more likely to lower the quality of 
legal reasoning, and endanger impartiality and ultimately the rule of law. My aim in 
this paper has been to defend the case for compassion in legal reasoning, and to do 
so via its role in helping us to imagine the perspectives of others more richly, including 
helping us to overcome instances of resistance to imagining certain perspectives. The 
process of compassion may be the best instrument judges have to hear and show 
respect to the perspectives of persons who come before them. Further, it may be the 
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best instrument for supplementing the inadequacy of knowledge that deals in 
abstractions – it may, in short, be the best way for keeping the law anchored to one 
of its key strengths, namely awareness of multiple constellations of concrete needs, 
interests and values at stake in the resolution of conflict.  
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audience at UNAM in Mexico in August 2016, especially from Imer Flores (the chair on that 
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